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Abstract 
 
In this paper I examine two prominent views regarding the value of mathematics within the republic. One 
view, formulated by Julia Annas, gives mathematics only instrumental value while the second view, 
attributed to M.F. Burnyeat, states that mathematics is constitutive of the Good. I will end up arguing, 
contrary to both views, that mathematics plays not only an instrumental role but also that it is also good 
“just for itself.” In other words, I place mathematics within the second category of goods defined at the 
start of Book II- good just for itself as well as good for its consequences. 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Many issues are discussed within Plato’s Republic but only a few are talked about as 
extensively as the mathematical education that philosopher-rulers must undergo. Yet 
despite Plato’s explication of the role of mathematics, there still remain many questions 
about the way in which mathematics is valued. When discussing the types of values 
found within the Repubic it is appropriate to remind ourselves of Plato’s classification 
of the types of goods in Book II. The first good is one that is desired not for any of its 
consequences but rather “for its own sake” (357b).1 The second type of good is one that 
is valued both “for its own sake, and also for the sake of its consequences,” while the 
third good is one that is desired only for its consequences (357b-d). As an example of 
the second type of good, Glaucon explicitly mentions knowing, seeing, and justice 
(357c-d). 
 
Within the recent literature, M. F. Burnyeat’s view regarding the value of mathematics 
has gained much acceptance. 2 He claims that in addition to an instrumental value, 3 
                                               
1
 All references to the Republic are based on C.D.C Reeve’s 2004 translation.  
 
2
 See for instance Huffman (2008).  
 
3
 Julia Annas (1981) establishes the instrumental view that mathematics is valued for its consequences. I 
will not examine her claim because it is clear from Books VI and VII that mathematics is, at least, good 
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mathematics plays a more significant role- it is valuable because the content of 
mathematics is somehow a part of the Good. Burnyeat thinks that studying mathematics 
is really a way to understand the Good because the study of mathematics is “a 
constitutive part of ethical understanding” (Burnyeat 6). I will call this the constitutive 
view.4 
 
Burnyeat begins his essay with an intuitive question, which seems to motivate his entire 
reading for the role of mathematics. I will challenge this intuitive question and then will 
move on to evaluate the constitutive view itself. After doing so, I will offer an 
alternative reading of the value of mathematics. I maintain that mathematics belongs in 
the second category of goods introduced in book II, although my grounds for drawing 
this conclusion are quite different from those that Burnyeat offers.  
  
 
II. Burnyeat’s Intuitive Question  
 
At the beginning of Burnyeat’s essay, he poses an interesting question: “why are 
[philosopher-rulers] required to study so much mathematics, for so long?” (Burnyeat 1). 
Huffman even suggests that this is “the central question about mathematics in the 
Republic” (Huffman 1). I take it that this question is the motivation for Burnyeat’s 
ensuing discussion; he attempts to explain why the philosopher-rulers are meant to 
study mathematics in so much depth. The question appears to focus on the length of 
time and the level of mathematical study that Plato calls for. This brings to the forefront 
a comparison between mathematics and the other studies required by the philosopher-
ruler. As I am sure Burnyeat has noted, mathematics must be studied for twice as long 
as dialectic. At 537c-e Plato states that “twenty year old,” philosophers in-training, 
must study mathematics formally until their “thirtieth year.” After this, they must take 
five years of training in dialectic. Burnyeat’s main question is, why would Plato 
prescribe mathematics for such a long time if it were not the case that mathematics 
plays some larger role than merely being instrumental to the philosopher’s education? 
 
Yet I think Burnyeat’s question is not as powerful as it first appears. The time spent on 
training does not establish anything about whether or not the training is more than 
instrumentally valuable. Take Olympic athletes as an analogy: If one wishes to become 
a gold medalist in the shot put, it is likely that they train for many years in order to 
make their country’s Olympic team. The type of exercise common in this routine might 
                                                                                                                   
for its consequences. The contentious issue is whether mathematics is valued for anything other than 
these instrumental uses and, if so, what particular value the discipline has. 
 
4
 Although Burnyeat does not connect his discussion to Book II, it is perhaps safe to assume that the 
Good is “good just for itself” and therefore mathematics would also be “good just for itself” because it is 
constitutive to a view of the Good. Thus Burnyeat seems to place mathematics within the second type of 
values introduced in Book II. Yet this conclusion is left implicit. 
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include things like weight-lifting, balance exercises, running, aerobics, and so on. It is 
likely that, collectively, the time spent carrying out this training regimen will exceed 
the time spent actually throwing the metal ball (which in each instance lasts only a few 
seconds). Thus, most of their training is not spent on their actual event.  
 
The comparison to philosophers-rulers should be clear – just as for the shot putter, 
much of the training for the philosophers is not in their “event.” If we do take an 
instrumental view of the role of mathematics, we might understand the event to be the 
study of dialectic while the training regimen, which prepares the philosopher for this 
event, to consist in mathematical studies. Most of the training is spent on conditioning 
the mind for dialectic’s a priori process just like much of the shot putter’s training is 
spent on conditioning the body in a general fashion. It would obviously be a mistake for 
someone to conclude, from the mere fact that the shot putter spends so much time doing 
generic exercises, that this exercise plays more than an instrumental role in attaining the 
gold medal in the shot put. Yet this is exactly the inference Burnyeat makes in respect 
to mathematics. He ends up concluding from the length of time spent studying 
mathematics that the discipline must play a constitutive role, rather than just an 
instrumental one, in the philosopher-rulers’ education. Therefore, this argument is a 
non sequitur; the conclusion that mathematics plays a larger role than mere 
instrumental training for the philosopher simply does not follow from the premise that 
they will spend a long time studying mathematics.  
 
But even if the motivation for his view is fallacious, as I have shown, it might still be 
that the view itself is correct. I will now consider the view itself: should we think that 
mathematics is constitutive of the Good? In the end, I argue that there are other errors 
in the arguments Burnyeat offers for his actual thesis.  
 
 
III. The Constitutive View 
 
Burnyeat’s thesis depends on being able to demonstrate that unity is constitutive of the 
Good as well as being a key concept within mathematics. According to Burnyeat, once 
he has shown that mathematical knowledge is constitutive of the Good he will have 
proven that by studying the former one understands at least a part of the Good. In order 
to show that unity is the key concept within mathematics, Burnyeat makes several 
arguments.  
 
The first is the idea that all five mathematical disciplines will be weaved “together into 
a unified vision of their kinship with one another”- a sort of synoptic view (537c). 
Burnyeat notes that the dialecticians in-training will study “in a particular order” the 
mathematics that had been studied, without any such order in their childhood (Burnyeat 
67, and see 537b-c). Burnyeat thinks this supports his interpretation because a synoptic 
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view implies a more objective perspective where one can view the relationship between 
previously studied parts. In other words, a synoptic perspective offers a view of the 
whole, organized, system of knowledge. The crucial words are “whole,” “unified,” and 
“objective” because they all suggest a unity of knowledge.  
 
The second piece of evidence is that the concept of “unit” is the basis for understanding 
any mathematics. All numbers, all line segments, all angles, rely upon the concept of 
“one” (525a, also see Burnyeat 30-31). Mathematics does seem to have as its object of 
study things that cannot be broken into constituent parts. Therefore “unity” is clearly a 
term used to describe mathematical objects. From these two examples, Burnyeat 
concludes that “unity” is the main property of mathematical knowledge. Yet next he 
must demonstrate that the Good is also characterized as a “unity.” 
 
To do this, Burnyeat claims that within the “ethical-political Books of the Republic 
unity is the highest value, which explains the more specific values of concord and 
attunement” (Burnyeat 74). In fact, he thinks concord and attunement are what “create 
and sustain unity” (74). To support these claims, Burnyeat draws attention to unity 
found within the other Forms. For instance, when Plato asks whether there is “any 
greater evil for a city than what tears it apart and makes it many instead of one” (462a-
b), it is clear that he is implying that the just city will be exemplified as a “unified 
community” (Burnyeat 74). Therefore, Justice appears to be characterized by the 
concept of unity. From this, Burnyeat claims that “unity is the highest value” (74) and 
therefore the Good itself is characterized as a unity.5 
 
In the end, Burnyeat maintains that the Good just is the unification of all values in a 
way that is similar to mathematical unity. For instance, the study of concord and 
attunement within harmonics produces knowledge of the Good because the latter is 
concerned with a balance between parts. If unity underlies all mathematical concepts as 
well as the concept of the Good then it is understandable how someone could think that 
mathematics is an integral part of the Good; after all, their basic content, “unity,” 
appears to be the same. By studying mathematics one actually studies the Good.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
5
 Although Burnyeat does not make this point explicitly, it is conceivable to support the claim that the 
“Good is unity” by noting the following: the fact that the Good resides at the top of the Line, that all 
other values, assumptions, and Forms are derived from it (511b-c) and that it is “the unhypothetical first 
principle of everything,” it seems like the Good is similar to the mathematical unit (Burnyeat 45, 
emphasis mine). 
Res Cogitans (2011) 2                                                                                                           Tenen | 210 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
IV. Objections to the Constitutive View  
 
(i) The first objection6 deals with the concept of “unity.” It seems possible to 
understand “unity” in two ways: the first is to understand a “unity” as something 
lacking parts while the second is to think of “unity” as a balance between parts. To put 
it differently, the opposite of “unity” can either be variety or disunity (chaos). I will call 
“unity between parts” a “functional” unity, whereas the unity defined as something that 
lacks parts will be called “metaphysical” unity.  
 
It is clear from Plato’s explanation of the Kallipolis at 428a-429d that the just city will 
have three classes (productive, guardian, and the philosopher-rulers), with each class 
doing their own job (433a). The result is that the just city is described as being a 
functional unity because the parts are in harmony. As mentioned earlier, Burnyeat 
correctly identifies Justice as being an instance of functional unity, or a balance 
between parts. One might notice that Socrates says the person who puts their soul into 
order “harmonizes the three elements together, just as if they were literally the three 
defining notes of an octave” (443d, italics mine).7 Mathematics therefore seems to deal 
with functional unity in the sense that it offers instruction on how to organize parts in 
order to make them seem as if they are parts of a functioning whole.  
 
Yet Plato describes the mathematical unit as “having no internal parts” (526a). 
Therefore, mathematics also captures the idea of metaphysical unity because the 
mathematical “unit,” or the idea of “one,” is an example of something that lacks parts. 
Notice that Justice is not characterized as a metaphysical unity at any point in the 
dialogue because both the Kallipolis and the just soul have three parts.  
 
Returning to Burnyeat’s argument, he states that the Good is characterized as a unity in 
the same way that mathematical unity is characterized. Yet we have just shown that in 
fact mathematical unity is conceived of in two ways: as a functional and as a 
metaphysical unity. Burnyeat does not notice the ambiguity regarding mathematical 
unity and therefore he does not say which of the two mathematical unities is 
constitutive of the Good. In short, Burnyeat has failed to isolate the single concept that 
characterizes both mathematics and the Good. 
 
(ii) Yet even if Burnyeat manages to clarify the preceding issue8 he faces an even more 
significant problem. The structure of his entire argument is to prove, first, that Justice is 
                                               
6
 This problem was first pointed out to me by Nicholas D. Smith.  
 
7
 In fact, this is the reason I have called it a “functional” unity; this type of unity is determined by the 
way the parts function together such that they act as if they are a (metaphysical) unit.  
 
8
 One way to do so, and which seems to be the direction Burnyeat is leaning, is to characterize both 
mathematics and the Good as a functional unity. Burnyeat focuses heavily on the higher-level 
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characterized as a unity and then, from this, conclude that the Good is also 
characterized as a unity. In other words, Burnyeat attempts to prove, from the premise 
that Justice is a unity, the conclusion that the Good is a unity. Yet at 511b-c Plato 
explains the proper method for arriving at knowledge of the Good:  
 
“[R]eason itself grasps by the power of dialectical discussion, treating its 
hypotheses, not as first principles, but as genuine hypotheses […] in order to 
arrive at what is unhypothetical and the first principle of everything. Having 
grasped this principle, it reverses itself and […] comes down to a conclusion, 
making no use of anything visible at all, but only of forms themselves, moving 
on through forms to forms, and ending in forms.” 
 
In present-day mathematics there is one methodology that forms proofs by relying on 
certain premises and deriving conclusions from them. Yet another methodology is to 
start from certain conclusions and attempt to derive an axiom, from which the 
conclusions logically follow. 9 It seems like Plato intends for the dialectician-in-training 
to use the latter methodology.10 To put it another way, the dialectician will only deduce 
things from the Form of the Good. It is clearly not the case that the Good will be 
deduced from “hypothetical first principles.”  
 
Going back to Burnyeat, it seems like he works from a premise, that Justice is a unity, 
and from this deduces that the Good is also a unity. This method reverses Plato’s 
intended process for arriving at knowledge of the Good. Thus, the argument concluding 
that, “unity is the highest value,” from the premise that Justice is a unity, seems to be 
flawed. Just from the fact that Justice is characterized as a “unity” it does not follow 
that the Good should be characterized in the same way. In fact, Plato does not allow the 
Good to be known via the method that Burnyeat employs.  
 
 
V. Mathematics as Instrumentally Valuable as well as Good for Itself 
 
In the last section, I showed that Burnyeat’s reasoning in support of his constitutive 
view was flawed and thus could not support his conclusion. Before I establish an 
                                                                                                                   
mathematical study of harmonics as well as the concord and attunement used to describe the Good- both 
are examples of functional unity. 
 
9
 As a historical note, one may be able to characterize the logicist’s methodology in this way, working 
from the mathematical theorems and attempting to arrive at logical axioms from which the former 
follow.  
 
10
 I recognize that logical terms such as “derivation,” “axiom,” and even “proof” had not yet been 
developed at the time that Plato lived. I use them here to improve readability because I think such logical 
terms map on well to Plato’s conception of argumentation.  
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alternative reading to Burnyeat’s interpretation, I will explain two requirements needed 
for my argument. The first is that I accept Nicholas D. Smith’s (2000) interpretation 
that Plato takes knowledge to be a power. For Plato, knowledge is not a state but is 
similar to sight- it is a power that may be developed. One notices that Plato speaks of 
such powers in numerous places (for instance, see most notably 477c-d, or 518e, 508e, 
and 527d-e) and therefore, to say that the mathematicians have knowledge is to blur this 
distinction. It is more accurate to speak of the mathematicians and dialecticians as 
having the power of knowledge- a power, however, which they have in different 
degrees of full realization.  The second requirement that I embrace is that Plato is a 
eudaimonist.11 If Plato is a eudaimonist then something is valued for its consequences 
just in case its consequences are conducive to eudaimonia. On the other hand, 
something is valued “just for itself” if it is conducive to eudaimonia just by itself. 12  
 
That mathematics is valued for its consequences is neither controversial nor difficult to 
show. Upon explaining to Glaucon the value of mathematics in Book VII, Socrates 
marvels about “the subject of calculation […and…] how refined it is and in how many 
ways it is useful for our purposes, provided you practice it for the sake of knowledge” 
(525c-d). The reason mathematics is useful for the attainment of knowledge is because 
“there is an instrument [in the soul] that is purified and rekindled by such subjects” 
(527d-e).  
 
It seems clear that Plato holds that mathematics is instrumentally valuable, and indeed 
necessary (526a) for the education of the philosopher-rulers. Upon the ascent up the 
Line, mathematics is valued for the consequences of “turning the soul,” which is 
conducive to knowledge of the Good (525c).  
 
Yet once the dialectician has attained a view to the Good they will continue to use 
mathematics in ordering the city. For instance, Socrates hopes “to prescribe this subject 
[mathematics] in [the] legislation and to persuade those who are going to take part in 
the greatest things in the city to go in for calculation” (525c). The legislators and 
philosopher-rulers will find it useful to use mathematics when ruling the Kallipolis 
because, for instance, when “setting up camp, occupying a region, gathering and 
ordering troops […] it makes all the difference whether someone is skilled in geometry 
or not” (526d). In short, mathematics is valued for making war and ordering the 
Kallipolis- both of which are consequences of the discipline upon descending the Line.  
 
                                               
11
 For limitations on space, I cannot argue for this claim here, but due to the fact that most scholars 
accept this claim I will rely on their defense of it. See specifically, Julia Annas’s (1995) Morality of 
Happiness, Oxford University Press.  
 
12
 In modern parlance instrumental values are usually contrasted with intrinsic values. I am not claiming 
that mathematics is intrinsically valuable, though, because assuming that Plato is a eudaimonist, it seems 
like eudaimonia is the only thing that is intrinsically valuable.  
Res Cogitans (2011) 2                                                                                                           Tenen | 213 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
Yet mathematics is not just valuable for its consequences. It is also valued “just for 
itself.” Plato’s mathematician will “hypothesize the odd and the even, the various 
figures, the three kinds of angles […] regarding them as known” (510c). As important 
as this activity is, it also seems like the mathematician is somehow deficient in her use 
of the power of knowledge because Socrates mentions, “we describe [geometry] as to 
some extent grasping what is” (533b). The reason the mathematician’s power of 
knowledge is not yet fully developed is because she must continue to rely on the use of 
visible images of mathematical Forms, and also cannot yet give an account of her 
hypotheses. In contrast, the dialectician, who has perfected the power of knowledge, is 
able to start from the “principle of everything” and come “down to a conclusion, 
making no use of anything visible at all, but only of forms themselves” (511b). This 
explains why Plato says that the mathematician will regard certain things as known 
(510c) rather than actually knowing them: the mathematician exercises the power of 
knowledge, producing the impression that she knows things, when really she uses the 
power imperfectly- producing something very close to knowledge but which is, itself, 
not the fullest realization of knowledge. 
 
Later, Plato distinguishes between “various kinds of knowledge” and “knowledge 
itself” (438c). For instance, knowledge itself is set over “what can be learned” while a 
specific kind of knowledge is of “a particular thing” such as houses or medicine (438c-
d). Plato mentions clearly that “all crafts and sciences” produce different kinds of 
knowledge because they are “of a particular sort of thing” (438d). Mathematics is 
included within the sciences and therefore, the mathematician will clearly be using the 
power of knowledge on mathematical objects. But if the mathematician uses the power 
of knowledge on mathematical objects then it appears, from Book II, that even this use 
of the power is good just for itself, no matter when it is used. After all, knowledge and 
sight are given as the paradigm cases of things valued for their consequences and just 
for themselves (357c).  
 
Yet perhaps a critic will reply that only the fully realized power of knowledge is good 
just for itself. In response, I will rely on the similarity that Plato draws between sight 
and knowledge.  A man may not have 20/20 vision but even though his sight is not 
perfect, it would make little sense to say that his vision is not valued just for itself.13 
Furthermore, Plato even concedes that not all uses of the power of sight are valuable. 
Recall from Book IV when Socrates recounts the story of Leontius, who struggles to 
control his animalistic desire to look at dead corpses even though the sight is horrible 
(439e-440a). From this passage, it is clear that Plato maintains that not all uses of sight 
are desirable but that the power of sight, at all times, is still good just for itself. 
Likewise, the mathematician uses the power of knowledge on mathematical objects (the 
equivalent of imperfect vision) but the power is still valued just for itself even though it 
                                               
13
 In fact, one need not have a perfect power of sight in order to value the ability to see just for itself. 
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is under-developed. The mathematician will value mathematical knowledge,14 at all 
times, because even an imperfect use of the power does not degrade the value of the 
power itself.   
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, I agree with Burnyeat that mathematics is valuable for something more 
than just its consequences, though my motivation for this claim is not based on his 
intuitive question. I also fault his view for leaving the concept of “unity” vague and for 
reversing the type of inference that Plato intends us to use to arrive at knowledge of the 
Good. As an alternative to Burnyeat’s view, I propose that one ought to pay closer 
attention to the kinds of value explained in Book II. Upon doing so, it seems apparent 
that things like knowledge are to be placed in the second category. Mathematical 
knowledge is no different- it is valued for its consequences as well always being good 
just for itself.15  
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